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RIGHTS OF LIFE TENANTS AND REMAINDER-
MEN IN CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS
By Hon. Alexander W. Smith, President of the Georgia Bar
Association.
For more than a century the courts of England and America
have been evolving the relative rights of life tenants and remain-
dermen in distributions made to holders of corporate stocks.
Ordinarily the question arises on devises of the income for life,
with remainder in fee simple, and, pending termination of the
life estate, the corporation issues new shares of stock in the form
of a stock dividend distributable to the owners of record. In
such case the question arises whether such new shares of stock
go to the life tenant as part of the income or to the remaindermen
as an addition to the corpus.
The earliest English cases adopted the rule that extraordinary
dividends, whether in cash or stock, belonged to the remainder-
men. (Brander v. Brander, 4 Ves. 8oo; Paris v. Paris, IO Ves.
185; Clayton v. Gresham, IO Ves. 288; Witts v. Steeve, 13 Ves.
363; Irvin v. Houston, H. of L. Cas., vol. 2, p. 267 S. C. 4 Paton
521). In Irvin v. Houston, 4 Paton 521, Lord Rosslyn, Lord
Alvanley concurring, said that if an owner of bank stock "gives
the life interest of his estate to any one, it can scarcely be his
meaning that the life renter should run away with a bonus that
may have been accumulating on the floating capital for half a
century"; and that to take an account of the precise amount of
profits which have accumulated before and after the commence-
ment of the life interest in particular shares would lead to incon-
veniences which would be intolerable.
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In later cases extra dividends, declared as such (cash divi-
dends), were held to go to the life tenant, but stock dividends to
the remaindermen. (It re Barton's Trust, L. R. 5 Eq. 238; Price
v. Anderson, 15 Sim. 473; Sproule v. Bouch, L. R. 29 Chan. Div.
635, 653, 659; Bouch v. Sproule, L. R. 12 App. Cas. 385). In
Barton's Trust shares in a steam navigation company were set-
tled by their owner upon trust to pay "the interest, dividends,
shares of profits or annual proceeds," to a woman during her
life, and after her death in trust for her children. The directors,
acting within the scope of their authority, retained part of a half
year's profits, and applied it to pay for new boats, and the com-
pany passed a resolution to issue to existing shareholders new
shares representing the money so applied. It was argued that
"the company had no power to compel the tenant for life to risk
any more in the venture than the shares originally held, and could
not be allowed for themselves by declaring or witholding a divi-
dend out of the profits, to alter the rights as between tenant for
life and remaindermen." But Vice-Chancellor Wood (afterwards
Lord Chancellor Hotherley) held otherwise, and said: "As long
as the company have the profits of the half year in their hands,
it is for them to say what they will do with it, subject, of course,
to the rule and regulations of the company". "The dividend to
which a tenant for life is entitled is the dividend which the com-
pany chooses to declare. And when the company meet and say
that they will not declare a dividend, but will carry over some
portion of the half year's earning to the capital account, and turn
it into capital, it is competent for them, I apprehend, to do so;
and when this is done, everybody is bound by it, and the tenant
for life of those shares cannot complain. The only mode in which
a tenant for life could act would be to use his influence with his
trustees as to their votes with reference to the proposed arrange-
ment." "If a man has his shares placed in settlement, he gives
his trustees, in whose name they stand, a power of voting, and
he must use his influence to get them to vote as he wishes. But
where the company, by a majority of their votes, have said that
they will not divide this money, but turn it all into capital, capital
it must be from that time. I think that this is the true principle,
and I must hold that these additional shares form part of the
capital fund under the settlement, and went to the children, and
not to the tenant for life (their mother)."
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In the case of Cummings v. Boswell (House of Lords) 2 Jur.
N. S. Ioo5, iooS, decided in 1856, the rule that extraordinary or
unusual dividends declared during the life estate, whether stock
or cash dividends, go to the corpus and not to the income, was
recognized as the general rule in Scotland as well as in England,
but was not applied in that case, because the first beneficiary was
not a life renter, but an absolute fiar, though during his minority,
before the expiration of which the bonus was declared, the income
was payable to trustees for his benefit. (A "fiar" in the Scotch
Law, is he whose property is burdened with a life rent. Bouvier.)
(Preston v. Melville, i6 Sim. 163; Price v. Anderson. 15 Sim.
473; Johnson v. Johnson, 15 Jus. 714). In the recent English
case of Sproule v. Bouch, 29 Ch. D. 653; 12 App. Cas. 397,
William Bouch bequeathed to his executor in trust for his widow
for life, and after her death to the executor, shares in an iron
company, whose directors had power, before recommending a
dividend, to set apart out of the profits such sums as they thought
proper as a reserved fund. Four years after the testator's death,
the company, upon the recommendation of the directors, and out
of a fund so reserved in the testator's lifetime, and of undivided
profits, about half of which accrued before his death, made a
bonus dividend, and an allotment of new shares, with liberty to
each shareholder to apply the bonus dividend in payment for the
new shares. Bouch's executor took the new shares and applied
the bonus dividend in payment therefor. The House of Lords,
reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and restoring an
order of Mr. Justice Kay, held that the corporation did not pay
or intend to pay any sum as a dividend, but intended to and did
appropriate the undivided profits as an increase of the capital
stock; that the bonus dividend was therefore capital of the testa-
tor's estate, and the widow was not entitled either to the bonus or
to the new shares.
So it will be seen that in none of the English cases was it ever
held that a stock dividend, or division of surplus among stock-
holders, went to the life tenant, the general rule being that extra,
ordinary or unusual dividends, whether in cash or stock, went
to the remaindermen, but in some exceptional cases a cash divi-
-dend, larger than the usual dividend and declared in cash as a
bonus, was held to belong to the life tenant.
The English rule is deduced as follows:
Ordinary dividends go to the life tenant; extraordinary divi-
dends to the remainderman.
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While some of the commentators speak of an "American
Rule" as distinguished from the English Rule, meaning thereby
the rule first laid down by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Earp's Appeal, such a designation is misleading. There are appar-
ently many divergencies in the rulings of the American State
courts, though a critical examination discloses that this divergence
is more apparent than real.
The Massachusetts rule is thus stated in Minot" v. Paine, 99
Mass. io8: "A simple rule is to regard cash dividends, however
large, as income, and stock dividends, however made, as capital."
Minot v. Paine has been followed consistently by the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts. (Adams v. Adams, 139 Mass. 449;
D'O'oge v. Leeds, 176 Mass. 558; Hemenway v. Hemenway, 181
Mass. 406; Atkins v. Albree, i2 Allen, 359; Daland v. Williams,
ioi Mass. 571; Leland v. Hayden, 102 Mass. 542; Rand v. Hub-
bell, ii 5 Mass. 461; Gifford v. Thompson, Ii 5 Mass. 478; Lyman
v. Pratt, 183 Mass. 58; Brownell v. Anthony, 189 Mass. 442.)
The essential characteristic of a cash dividend is that it changes
the title from the corporation to the stockholders, the assets of
the company to the extent of the dividend being permanently and
definitely reduced.
The essential characteristic of a stock dividend is that it trans-
fers none of the corporate assets from the company to its stock-
holders; it does not change the amount of respective holdings in
the company, but only dilutes the value of shares in exact propor-
tion to the increase of their number. (Gibbons v. Mahon, 136
U. S. 549; Mann v. Anderson, io6 Ga. 88; Williams v. W. U.
Tel. Co., 93 N. Y. 189.)
In Hentenway v. Hemenway, i8i Mass. 406, the stockholders
of a corporation accepted an offer to sell all of the stock, the sale,
however, not to include certain "treasury assets", which were to
be liquidated and distributed to the stockholders as an extraor-
dinary dividend. A dividend was declared by the directors out
of these assets as "representing accumulated and undivided profits
of the company." Upon a bill for instructions by trustees under
a will, to determine whether the dividend should be treated as
capital or income, it was held that, the directors having treated
the assets as income, as they might properly do, the entire divi-
dend should be regarded as income. It was contended by the
remaindermen that the real transaction was a transfer of the cor-
poration by a sale of the stock, and that the distribution of the
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assets, though in form a dividend, was in reality a part of the
consideration received for the stock, and should therefore be
regarded as principal, and not income. The Court assumed that,
if that were the real nature of the transaction, the contention that
the dividend, so-called, was principal, and not income, would have
been sound; but said that it saw no reason to doubt that the
description of the dividend in the vote declaring it was a true one,
or that the dividend was intended to be and was a, dividend of
profits.
In Adams v. Adams, 139 Mass. 449, the Court said that the
many cases in which stock dividends have been declared to be
capital, and dividends payable in money to be income, all proceed
upon the ground that it is the declaration of the dividend which
creates it as a dividend; and the form of the declaration, as shown
by the action of the corporation construed in the usual way, deter-
mines the character of the dividend-whether it is a distribution
of capital stock, or a division of profits.
In D'Ooge v. Leeds, 176 Mass. 558, the Court said, "The rule
in Massachusetts is now well established. Everything is made to,
turn upon the action of the corporation. 'A simple rule is to
regard cash dividends, however large, as income, and stock divi-
dends, however made, as capital.' (Citing M1inot v. Paine, and
other Massachusetts cases.) In considering the distribution to
determine its character, substance, and not form, is regarded.
The simple question in every case is whether the distribution
made by the corporation is of money to be spent as income, or
is of capital to be held as an investment in the corporation."
The Massachusetts rule is squared with the English rule by
construing cash dividends to be ordinary dividends and stock
dividends to be extraordinary dividends.
In Brinley v. Grou, 50 Conn. 66, the new shares went to the
trustees as a part of the principal of the fund, and not to the
children as part of the income. This case has been followed in
Connecticut. (Spooner v. Phillips et al., Conn. 16 L. R. A. 461 ;
Boardiftan v. Mansfield, 79 Conn. 634; Bulkley v. Worthington,
&c., Society, 78 Conn. 526; Smith v. Dana. 77 Conn. 543; Board-
man v. Boardman, 78 Conn. 451.)
In Green v. Bissell, 79 Conn. 547, the Court, in explaining the
Massachusetts rule as applied to stock dividends, said: "The
declaration of a stock dividend involves the creation and issue
of new shares of stock. The basis of the issue, in so far as pay-
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ment'into the corporation is not required of the recipient, is sur-
plus assets, which thus become converted into strict capital with
all which that implies. From the process there results an increase
of both the number of outstanding shares and the amount of
the corporate assets which have had that peculiar dedication to
the corporate uses, which entitles them to the name of capital,
strictly speaking."
Quoting from Smith v. Dana, 77 Conn. 543: "It is also one of
the incidents of a stock dividend that the stockholder who receives
his pro-rata proportion of a new issue, while he acquires the own-
ership of more shares, adds nothing to his proportionate owner-
ship of the assets of the corporation. His holding after the new
issue bears precisely the same ratio to the total of the outstanding
shares of the corporation as did his previous holding to the pre-
vious total." The Connecticut Court seems to lay down the doc-
trine that it is universally true that surplus earnings do not, as
to stockholders, partake of the character of income until they are
declared as dividends; and whether they will ever be so declared
is a matter of uncertainty, since, speaking generally, they may,
in the discretion of the directors, although not capitalized, be for--
ever retained in the corporation to serve as a part of its working
capital. In this state and elsewhere it is only to surplus earnings
-declared in cash that the character of income attaches, and through
the medium of stock dividends they may go to capital, and per-
manently insure to the benefit of that interest.
The Massachusetts rule giving stock dividends to the corpus
was applied in re Brown, 14 R. I. 371, where stock dividends were
-declared from surplus, without inquiring as to the time when the
surplus was earned.
In Richardson v. Richardson, 75 Me. 570, the Court says: "The
decided preponderance of authority probably conceded the point
that dividends of stock go to the capital, under all ordinary cir-
-cumstances. But we are well convinced that the general rule,
-deducible from the latest and wisest decisions, declared all money
,dividends to be profit or income, belonging to the tenant for life,
including not only the usual annual dividend, but all extra divi-
,dends or bonuses payable in cash from the earnings of the com-
pany". . . . "We think the true rule to be that when a divi-
dend upon stock is declared by a corporation it belongs to the
person holding the stock at the time, whether the holder be a life
tenant or remainderman, without regard to the source from which
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or the time during which the profits and earnings divided were
acquired by the company."
Some of the strongest cases following the Massachusetts rule
have been decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois. (Billings
et al v. Warren, 216 Ills. 281; Bluin v. Gillett, 208 Ills. 473;
DeKoven et al, trustee, v. Alsop, et al, 2o5 Ills. 309.) The
DeKoven-Alsop case holds that extraordinary cash dividends on
stock owned by the testator, declared after his death, though
earned during his life, were payable to the life tenant as
income; that stock dividends declared after the death of the
testator, who had devised his stock in trust to pay the income
to the life tenant and the principal to a remainderman, were to be
held for the benefit of the remainderman, whether the earnings
which they represented accrued before or after the death of the
testator.
The Pennsylvania rule ignores the character of the dividend as
the criterion of the rights of the parties, but inquires as -to the
time, relative to the inception of the life estate, covered by the
accumulation of earnings from which the extraordinary dividends
were declared, and, if it ascertains that the entire fund accumu-
lated before the inception of the life estate, awards the entire
dividend, whether stock or cash, to the corpus; and if the entire
fund accumulated after the inception, and during the continuance
of the life estate, awards the entire dividend to income; and if
the fund accumulated partly before and partly after the inception
of the life estate, apportions the dividend, whether stock or cash,
between the life tenant and the remainderman. The first case in
which the Pennsylvania rule was clearly announced was Earp's
Appeal, 28 Pa. 368.
South Carolina is sometimes quoted as in line with the Penn-
sylvania rule citing Cobb v. Fant, 36 S. C. i, but it is not a pre-
cedent, because it is decided on the peculiar language of the trust
deed involved in the case.
The dictum in Earp's Appeal is at variance with the language of
the same court in Moss' Appeal, 83 Pa. 268, and was expressly
disapproved in Connolly's Estate, 198 Pa. 137. The Pennsylvania
rule seems to have been followed, substantially, in New Hamp-
shire (Holbrook v. Holbrook, 74 N. H. 201), in Maryland
(Thomas v. Gregg, 78 Md. 545) and in New Jersey (Lang v.
Lang, 57 N. J. Eq. 325).
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The Kentucky rule disregards the character of the dividend as
a criterion by which the respective rights of life tenant and
remainderman are determined. It takes no account of the time
relative to the inception of the life estate covered by the accumu-
lation of the earnings out of which the dividend is declared, and
repudiates the principle of apportionment. Thus, the Court, in
Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 257, held that a stock dividend representing
earnings made by the corporation was income belonging to the life
tenant, the settled rule being that dividends, whether stock or
cash, are non-apportionable, and must be considered as accruing
as of the date declared; and that, if the life tenancy has begun
when a cash dividend is declared, it belongs to the life tenant,
although it results in part from profits previously earned, and
goes to him irrespective of the time when it is earned.
Properly understood, the New York rule follows the action of
the corporation in distributing the stock. It differs from Penn-
sylvania and coincides with Kentucky in that it repudiates appor-
tionment, and from the Massachusetts rule in that a stock divi-
dend may go to the life tenant if the corporate action declaring it
makes it a distribution of earnings rather than a capitalization of
surplus.
Chester v. Buffalo Car M4lfg. Co., 7o App. Div. 443, is based
upon two general propositions: (i) That a corporation with a
surplus of accumulated profits within the limits of good faith has
the power either to distribute it as dividends, or to retain it and
convert it into capital; (2) that the substance and intent of the
action of the company, as evidenced by its treatment of the sur-
plus, and its resolutions in issuing new stock against it, will be
considered by, if they will not control, the courts, in deciding
whether such issue is dividend, and hence income belonging to
the life tenant or not; that, if the company pays money, or issues
stock, as a distribution of the profits, it will ordinarily go to the
life tenant; but if it issues stock as capital, and appropriates its
surplus as an increase of the capital stock of the concern, such
issue will be held to inure to the benefit of the remainderman.
The Iowa rule may be taken from Kalbach v. Clark, 133 Ia.
.:215, from which the following quotation is made: "We shall not
attempt to review the cases cited in support of the different rules.
He who cares to know the logic thereof may read. Our duty is
performed when we establish a rule for this State which we
believe is best sustained on principle and by authority. That rule
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more nearly approximates what is called the American than any
other. Under it, we start with the notion that all pure dividends,
whether in cash, or stock, or other property, are a part of the
income, and, when declared, should go to the life tenant and not
to the remainderman, as it is not a part of the corpus of the prop-
erty, but a part of the income derived from the use and manage-
ment thereof. Any dividends, so-called, presumptively belong
to the life tenant, as they are, in the absence of a showing to the
contrary, assumed to have been divided as profits. If, however,
the so-called stock dividends represent the corporate capital-that
is, represent nothing but the natural growth or increase in the
value of the permanent property, so that there is merely a change
in the form of ownership---such stock should go to the remainder-
man; for in such cases the dividend is a dividend of capital, repre-
senting simply an increase in the value of the physical property,
good will, or other thing of tangible value."
The rule in Georgia is fixed by the Code, as follows: "The
natural increase of the property belongs to the tenant for life.
Any extraordinary accumulation of the corpus-such as the issue
of new stock upon the share of an incorporated or joint-stock
company-attaches to the corpus and goes with it to the remain-
derman." Code of I9io, Sec. No. 3667, recently construed in
Jackson v. Maddox, 70 S. E. Rep. 865.
The leading case in Tennessee is Pritchett v. Nashville Trust
Co., 96 Tenn. 472. A life tenant is entitled to stock dividends
declared from net earnings made after the respective rights of the
life tenant and remaindermen have attached to corporate stock
bequeathed to them. This case obliterates all distinction between
cash dividends and stock dividends, ordinary dividends and extra-
ordinary dividends, and capitalization of earnings. In this respect
it antagonizes the Massachusetts rule and follows Pennsylvania.
The question of apportionment was not involved. The case,
however, turns on the resolutions under which these "dividends"
were declared.
On Feb. 16, 1907, the Supreme Court of Tennessee decided the
case of Tubb v. Fowler, et al, 99 S. W. Rep. 988. There the life
tenant sought to force the executor to sell the stock, restoring its
par value to the trust and paying to her the excess brought by
reason of its share in the surplus and undivided profits, claiming
the same, on the ground that it belonged to her as "income." The
Court says: "Where a widow was entitled under her husband's
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will to the income of bank stock, the portion of surplus and
undivided profits held by the banks apportionable to the shares
could not be regarded as 'income.'"
The Supreme Court of the United States had occasion to con-
sider the question in Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549, and in a
lucid and convincing opinion enunciated what should rightfully be
known as the "American Rule" on the subject. In the course of
the opinion the Court said:
"The distinction between the title of a corporation, and the
interest of its members or stockholders, in the property of the
corporation, is familiar and well settled. The ownership of the
property is in the corporation, and not in the holders of shares of
stock. The interest of each stockholder consists in the right to
a proportionate part of its property whenever dividends are
declared by the corporation, during its existence under its charter,
and to a like proportion of the property remaining upon the ter-
mination or dissolution of the corporation after payment of its
debts. Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573, 584; Delaware Rail-
road Tax, 18 Wall. 206-230; Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U. S.
129, 136; New Orleans v. Houston, 119 U. S. 265-277.
"Reserved and accumulated earnings, so long as they are held
and invested by the corporation, being part of its corporate prop-
erty, it follows that the interest therein, represented by each
share, is capital, and not income, of that share, as between the
tenant for life and the remainderman, legal or equitable thereof.
"Whether the gains and profits of a corporation should be so
invested and apportioned as to increase the value of each share
of stock, for the benefit of all persbns interested in it, either for
a term of life or of years, or by way of remainder in fee; or
should be distributed and paid out as income, to the tenant for
life -or for years, excluding the remainderman from any partici-
pation therein, is a question to be determined by the action of the
corporation itself, at such times and in such manner as the fair
and honest administration of its whole property and business may
require and permit, and by a rule applicable to all holders of like
shares of its stock; and cannot, without producing great embar-
assment and inconvenience, be left open to be tried and deter-
mined by the courts as often as it may be litigated between persons
claiming successive interests under a trust created by the will of
a single shareholder, and by a distinct and separate investigation,
through a master in chancery or otherwise, of the affairs and
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accounts of the corporation, as of the dates when the provisions
of the will of that shareholder take effect, and with regard to his
shares only.
"A stock dividend really takes nothing from the property of the
corporation, and adds nothing to the interest of the shareholders.
Its property is not diminished and their interests are not
increased. After such a dividend as before, the corporation has
the title in all the corporate property; the aggregate interests
therein of all the shareholders are represented by the whole num-
ber of shares; and the proportional interest of each shareholder
remains the same. The only change is in the evidence which
represents that interest, the new shares and the original shares
together representing the same proportional interest that the origi-
nal shares represented before the issue of new ones."
Whatever of confusion is noticeable in the decisions of the
Courts may be traced to their failure always to bear in mind that
the stockholder has no title to the assets of his corporation. The
corporation, as a separate entity and a legally living person, not
only owns its assets, but, within the bounds of good faith and in
the exercise of business discretion ascertained and expressed
through the media of its charter and by-laws, has absolute power
to dictate whether they shall be permanently capitalized or period-
ically distributed. If a minority only short of a majority is with-
out power to control such action, much less can a single stock-
holder through the instrumentality of his will effect such a result.
It is a fallacy to argue that surplus is income because derived
from earnings which should have been paid out to stockholders
as earned, and that when finally transformed into capital stock,
xeo nomine, the certificates representing it should be treated as
income and turned over to the stockholders. The fallacy of this
argument is fundamental. Surplus is never anything but capital.
Year by year, as the directors take under consideration the declar-
ation of dividends, they must ascertain whether the business of
the corporation is increasing-the earnings increasing-the invest-
ments increasing,--and they may find everything increasing
except the capital stock. If it is a healthful and successful cor-
poration, they will inevitably find these things. If all the earn-
ings are segregated, reduced to cash, paid out as made, the
increase bulging out on every side must stop. The surplus would
never accumulate, and for the best of all reasons-it would not be
,earned. One cannot eat a cake and have it, too.
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The outcome of the cases in the Supreme Court of the United
States, and of New York, Illinois and some of the other states,
is that the solution of the question is crystallized in the action of
the corporation. If the object in view is to decrease the assets
- of the corporation by paying out a portion of the same in dis-
tributable form, the corporate action should be the declaration
of a dividend with a provision for its disbursement without reser-
vation. Then it becomes income to the stockholder and goes to
the life tenant. If on the other hand the object is to retain title
to all the assets of the corporation and merely change the repre-
sentative muniments of interest therein, such as the conversion of
surplus into permanent capital, the corporate action should clearly
indicate such purpose and the courts will have no difficulty in
carrying out such a bona fide intention.
One or two practical suggestions in conclusion. When advis-
ing a corporation as to capitalizing surplus or issuing stock divi-
dends, it would be well to ascertain whether or not any of its
stock is held for account of life tenants and remaindermen, exam-
ine the instrument creating the dual estate, and make the corpor-
ate action, in good faith, do justice to both interests. When advis-
ing a testator desiring to bequeath corporate stocks to one for life
and another in remainder, let the will specifically define income
to mean only such distributions to the shares involved as are pay-
able out of, and serve to decrease, the assets of the corporation
in the form of distributable and absolute dividends, and prescribe
that all stock dividends, or other form of increasing the number
of shares without disturbing the title of the corporation to all of
its assets, shall go to the remainder as a part of the corpus.
Alex. W. Smith.
Atlanta, Ga., 1911.
